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Allocating property rights on an open access resource which has been
freely exploited in the past is often very problematic. Involved agents
typically rely on one of two competing principles to determine future al-
location. The ﬁrst priority principle, ﬁrst in time, ﬁrst in rights favors
the status quo while the other one, historical accountability, is a correc-
tive justice argument. We construct a simple model inspired by the claims
problem literature to show that these two positions are in fact compatible:
they deﬁne bounds to the set of possible allocations. We detail a family
of methods which meets these bounds and characterize the two extreme
points of this family: the equal sharing and the uniform gains methods.
Keywords: Claims problems, axiomatic solutions, distributive jus-
tice, environmental economics, property rights, tragedy of the commons.
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1 Introduction
The so-called "tragedy of the commons"1 concerns the free access regime to a common
resource (ﬁsheries, water, stock of clean air...), where every agent exploits indepen-
dently the common. It is known that this regime leads to over-exploitation of the
resource. The lack of eﬃciency of this free access regime is due to the absence of clear
property rights: each agent can choose freely whether to exploit or not the resource
and at what level. Eﬃciency requires reducing the exploitation level by regulating
the access to the common. In practice, an approach employed increasingly for coping
with the problem of rationing access to a common is the "Cap and Trade" programme
(see Tienteberg, 2003, for a survey of concrete applications), which involves permits
trading.
In a Cap and Trade approach, a total resource access limit (the cap) is deﬁned
and allocated among users. A permits market is then created in order to facilitate the
trading of property rights among users. Compliance is established by simply com-
paring actual use with the assigned user-speciﬁc cap as adjusted by any acquired or
sold permits. In practice, regulatory tools are implemented by deﬁning speciﬁc prop-
erty rights over the resource. Several methods for allocating initial entitlements have
been used (lotteries, auctions...) but the most common method for the applications
discussed here is allocating property rights free of charge, based upon historic use.
However, fair allocation in this context is a controversial issue because involved
agents typically rely on two diﬀerent principles to determine the allocation of prop-
erty rights: agents which have already highly exploited the resource claim that they
"acquired" a larger share of the resource by investing more in it, while agents which
have exploited less claim that they should obtain a larger share of what is remaining
because they have beneﬁted less from it. The ﬁrst argument, known as "ﬁrst in time,
ﬁrst in rights" in the literature (see for example Ott and Sachs, 2002), considers
agent's current level of exploitation as a ﬁrm property right over the resource. This
1See Ostrom (1999) or Moulin (2004) for comprehensive reviews of the "tragedy".
3
argument can be tracked as far as Locke (Second Treatise of Government) who ar-
gues that an agent could claim to ownership of a common resource by working on this
resource (by "mixing" his labor with the resource). This argument is further devel-
oped in the "entitlement theory of justice" of Robert Nozick (1974). In the pollution
case, it translates as follows: because the high-emitting countries were unaware that
they were overusing a commonsemissions is the by-product of a wealth creation
processit would be unfair to ask them to restrict their use to a lower total share
than other agents. The competing argument, traditionally named "historical account-
ability", considers that agents whom have beneﬁted less from a common in the past
should obtain a higher amount of what remains. This argument of corrective justice
considers the resource has a common property. In the pollution case, this principle
is often associated with a general "right to development" linked to the future needs
of agents whom have emitted less in the past and, as such, are deemed to be less
responsible for the accumulated stock of past emissions.
These principles are seldom explicitly advocated but underlie many of the ar-
guments on the subject. In fact, they are often associated with speciﬁc methods for
allocating the rights: respectively proportional sharing (with respect to past exploita-
tion) and equal sharing (of what is left of the resource). For several environmental
problems, the ﬁrst principle is often selected and property rights are typically allo-
cated proportionally to past emissions (e.g, the Acid Rain Program of the 1990 Clean
Air Act in the USA). This obviously contradicts the historical accountability principle
and, in practice, contestations are overcome by the presence of a regulatory agency
which enforces the allocation. However, the problem remains intact for situations
where no regulatory agency exists. The allocation of property rights over CO2 emis-
sions is one of the prominent examples of such a situation: a voluntary agreement
must be reached because no international authority can enforce a given allocation.
Our goal is to design a method for allocating property rights which may overcome
objections based on these fairness arguments.
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The literature in environmental economics has long recognized the importance
of fairness issues. For the climate change example, a ﬁrst strand of literature (see
for example, Rose et al., 1998, and Tol, 2001) focuses on determining the impact
of diﬀerent allocations methods on welfare and emission paths using diﬀerent setups
calibrated to real world data (i.e. integrated assessment model for Rose et al.). A
second strand is interested in identifying "fairness bias" (see for example Johansson-
Stenman and Konow, 2010) or the strategic use of fairness argument to improve one's
payoﬀ (see Lange et al., 2010, for a recent reference). Our focus here is quite dif-
ferent: we formally assess the link between the main fairness argumentsconsidered
as axiomsand the allocation methods that they logically imply. The main contri-
bution of the paper lies in the characterization of allocation methods meeting both
principles.
Following a well established opinion in the climate change literature, we feel that
deﬁning a family of methods for allocating property rights which meets both bounds
will help reach the voluntary agreements of all agents. This argument is exposed
by Müller (1999) as follows: "the chances of overcoming a doomsday negotiating
scenario are enhancedindeed, maximized as far as selection bases are concerned
by adopting what I shall refer to as an "equitable" selection base including all (and
only) the proposals put forward by the parties concerned, provided (i) they can be
justiﬁed by an equity principle, (ii) they do not give rise to double counting, and (iii)
the principles involved are "morally independent"."
We thus start by deﬁning formally both equity principles and show that they are
independent. In our setup, the ﬁrst property ﬁrst in time, ﬁrst in rights translates
as follows: if an agent has exploited a resource more than an other, then he should
not obtain a lower amount of the whole resource. Note that a stronger version of this
principle has been proposed in the literature2: if an agent has exploited a resource
more than an other, then he should not obtain a lower share of the remaining resource.
2See, for an example in a diﬀerent framework, Rose et al. (1998).
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We view this version as overly strong because it extends the rights on what has not
yet been exploited. In fact, even the most fervent proponents of the argument do not
support this interpretation, because it excludes the "Lockean Proviso" (see Nozick,
1974): though individuals have a right to acquire private property from nature, they
must leave "enough and as good in common...to others." The proviso says that though
every appropriation of property is a diminution of another's rights to it, it is acceptable
as long as it does not make anyone worse oﬀ than they would have been without any
private property. Extending the property rights from past exploitation to the non-
exploited resource clearly violates the proviso. We thus choose to retain a deﬁnition
closer to the original ethical justiﬁcation3. The deﬁnition of the second property,
historical accountability, is more consensual in the literature. It translates as follows:
if an agent has exploited a resource less than an other, then he should not obtain a
lower share of the remaining resource.
We use a model inspired by the rationing and surplus sharing literature4 to address
the problem. The remaining resource to be shared is equal to the initial stock of
the resource minus the sum of the quantities already exploited by each agent. The
problem consists in ﬁnding an allocation over what is left of the resource, using past
exploitation as the relevant information for allocating shares. This problem diﬀers
from the traditional rationingand surplus sharingone because we cannot consider
past exploitation as legitimate "claims": there is no a priori reasons to consider the
past exploitation of an agent as a minimum or maximum value for his future share.
We ﬁrst discuss traditional surplus-sharing methods in this context. We introduce
two properties, sustainability and autarky, which contribute to the characterization of
the most progressive and the most regressive methods among the family of methods
3However, if one chooses to retain this version of the principle, excluding the Proviso, then it will
be clear from the proof of our results that only one method meets both principles: the equal sharing
method.
4See Young (1987) and Young (1990) for applications of these models to the taxation problem.
See Moulin (2002) and Thomson (2003) for comprehensive surveys.
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we propose. By a "progressive" method, we mean one which gives a higher quantity
of what is remaining to agent i, relatively to agent j, if agent i has exploited less
the resource than j before, and conversely for a "regressive" method (as in Young,
1990). The goal of these properties is to give priority in the distribution to those
agents which have already exploited less or, respectively, exploited more, the resource.
Sustainability considers that an agent should not obtain more than the quantity
he would have obtained if all agents had exploited the resource similarly as him.
This property, along with ﬁrst in time, ﬁrst in rights, historical accountability, and
consistency (a well-known property on claims problem literature) characterizes the
uniform gain solution, the most progressive method meeting ﬁrst in time, ﬁrst in
rights. Autarky says that the share of an agent should only depend upon her own
past exploitation and the amount to be shared, and not upon the distribution of past
exploitation. This property, along with ﬁrst in time, ﬁrst in rights and historical
accountability, characterizes the equal sharing method. Many observers advocated
this method as being the most progressive one (i.e, Posner and Sunstein, 2002).
Surprisingly, this is the most regressive method meeting historical accountability.
Then, we propose a family of methods which meets both bounds. It turns out
that a simple representation of this family of methods possesses a "progressivity"
parameter which allows to select among a convex set of the two methods equal sharing
and uniform gains. Finally, we propose a dynamic interpretation of the model in order
to address the problem of regulating successive ﬂows of pollution or the renewable
resource case.
2 The model and the main properties
Let N = {1, ..., n} be the set of agents (ﬁrms, individuals or countries). Each agent
i ∈ N has already exploited a quantity xi ≥ 0 of a resource. Let x = (xi)i²N be the
proﬁle of these quantities. The initial stock of this resource is denoted by t, where
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t ∈ R+. This amount may be the existing stock of the resource (e.g. oil or gas
reservoir, water tank) or the available quantity above a threshold (e.g. clean air)
exogenously set. The problem is to share what remains of the resource, the amount
r, which is equal to t −∑N xi ≥ 0. The triple (N, r, x) denotes a "rights sharing
problem", or simply a "problem".
A method associates with any problem (N, r, x) a proﬁle of individual quantities
y denoted y = s(N, r, x) such that yi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N and
∑
N yi = r. In contrast
with the traditional rationing problem (and surplus sharing) the quantities yi are not
constrained a priori by the already exploited shares xi. Any agent i can obtain a
quantity yi higher or lower than xi. We denote by zi the total quantity of an agent i:
zi = yi + xi.
The link between past exploitation and future quantities is done through two
properties. They assign basics responsibilities to all agents given their relative past
exploitation5:
First in time, ﬁrst in rights: For all N , all i, j ∈ N , i 6= j and all x,
xi ≥ xj ⇒ zi ≥ zj
Historical accountability: For all N , all i, j ∈ N , i 6= j and all x,
xi ≥ xj ⇒ yi ≤ yj
These principles are compatible and deﬁne bounds upon the set of possible allo-
cations. These bounds are binding, some well-known methods do not meet one or
the other of the properties: for example, the proportional method fails historical ac-
5These properties are related to the ranking property introduced in the claims problem literature
(see Moulin, 2002).
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Figure 1: The two agents case
countability. Figure 1 represents the boundaries imposed by these properties on the
set of possible allocations for the two agents case.
3 Progressive and regressive methods
We introduce two properties, Sustainability and Autarky, which assign stronger re-
sponsibilities to agents given their past exploitation. The ﬁrst property asks for some
prior notations: deﬁne the proﬁle xi as the proﬁle in which all agents have exploited
the same quantity as agent i: xi1 = xi2 = ... = xin = xi and ri as the remaining amount
in such a proﬁle: ri = max(t− nxi, 0). Then, Sustainability deﬁnes a bound on each
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agents' share: no agent should obtain more than the quantity he would have obtained
if all agents had exploited the resource similarly as himself.
Sustainability: For all N , all i ∈ N , all r and all x,
yi = si(N, r, x) ≤ y¯i = si(N, ri, xi)
Sustainability is especially binding for agents which have already beneﬁted more
from the resource. As such, it can be viewed as a protective criterion for agents which
have exploited relatively less the resource in the past6.
The second property says that no agent should be responsible for the distribution
of past exploitation: the allocation of an agent should only depend on the level of her
past exploitation and the remaining resource to be shared.
Autarky: For all N , all i ∈ N , all r, all x and all x′,
x′i = xi
r′ = r
 =⇒ y′i = yi.
Autarky implies that the distribution of past exploitation should be irrelevant for
sharing what is left of the resource. As such, it is a protective criterion for those
agents which have relatively exploited more the resource in the past: they should not
be penalized for having already exploited more than other agents.
The last property is a well-known property on claims problem literature: con-
6For a discussion on such protective criteria, see Herrero and Villar (2001) and Yeh (2004). These
papers discuss of properties which insure a preferential treatments to small claims in the rationing
problem.
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sistency7. Interpreted as a general principle of distributive justice, it says that an
allocation is fair when restricted to any subgroup of the population: by removing one
agent, or a subgroup of agents, from the society N and the resources allocated to this
agent, or these agents, the allocation of shares within the reduced society remains the
same.
Consistency: For all N , all i ∈ N , all r and all x,
s(N, r, x)N\i = s(N\i, r − si(N, r, x), xN\i)
We are now ready to characterize the uniform gain method and the equal sharing
method. The proofs of both theorems are in the appendix. Formally, the uniform
gains method is deﬁned as follows:
Uniform gains method: For all N , all i ∈ N and all x,
ugi(N, r, x) = (λ− xi)+, where λ is s.t
∑
N(λ− xi) = r
Theorem 1. The uniform gains method is the only rights sharing method which meets
ﬁrst in time, ﬁrst in rights, historical accountability, sustainability and consistency.
The uniform gains method aims at equalizing the total shares ((zi)i∈N) among all
agents. It will be clear from the proof of our results that the uniform gains method is
the method which erases as much as possible the original inequality in the distribution
given ﬁrst in time, ﬁrst in rights.
We deﬁne the equal sharing method as follows:
7See Thomson, 1996, for a comprehensive survey on this property.
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Equal sharing method: For all N , all i ∈ N , all r and all x,
esi(N, r, x) =
r
n
Theorem 2. The equal sharing method is the only rights sharing method which meets
ﬁrst in time, ﬁrst in rights, historical accountability and autarky.
It is noteworthy that the equal sharing method is the method which preserves the
most the original inequality in the distribution of past exploitation given historical
accountability.
4 A family of methods
We now propose a family of methods meeting both bounds, ﬁrst in time, ﬁrst in rights
and historical accountability. It turns out that a simple representation of this family
of methods possesses a "progressivity" parameter a which allows to select among a
convex set of the two methods equal sharing and uniform gains :
Fair methods: For all N , all i ∈ N , all t and all x,
fmi(N, r, x) = ai + (
t
N
− xi)
where ai = α(max(xi− tN , λ))+(1−α)(xi−
∑
N xj
N
), λ such that
∑
N max(xi− tN , λ) = 0
and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
This family of method simply assigns to each agent i an equal quantity of the total
resource ( t
N
) minus his own past exploitation (xi) and adds a positive or negative
term ai which allows to select a more or less progressive method. When α = 0, we
obtain precisely the equal sharing method :ai = xi −
∑
N xj
N
for all i, j, and when
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Figure 2: A method of the family, two agents case
α = 1 the proﬁle of quantities y coincides exactly with the uniform gains allocation:
ai = max(xi − tn , λ) with λ such that
∑
N ai = 0. Thus, one can view α as a
"progressivity" parameter, and accommodates a predetermined goal of preservation
of the inequality in the original distribution of past exploitation/emissions. Figure 2
represents this family of methods for the two agents case.
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5 Dynamic interpretation of the model and succes-
sive sharing
For numerous environmental problems, one may want to regulate the successive ﬂows
of pollution instead of the total stock of the resource (e.g. for the regulation of CO2
emissions). The treatment of a renewable resource also asks for a more "dynamic"
interpretation of the model due to the occurrence of successive sharing. We provide
such an interpretation along with a crucial property tied to the problem we name
Time Consistency (also known as Path Independence or Composition Down8).
In order to understand the problem of successive sharing, let consider two steps
(two "periods"): the ﬁrst one in which the total amount of the resource to be shared
is equal to t and the second one in which it is equal to t′, with t′ ≥ t. The problem
is to share t in the ﬁrst stage, and the increment t′ − t in the second step. We can
interpret the quantity t′ − t as either being the new amount of resources "created"
during the ﬁrst period (for a renewable resource) or as the current amount of resource
that the regulator wishes to allocate at this period (in which case the proﬁle of con-
sumption should be interpreted as ﬂows of consumption for a given period). We can
either consider to compute the solution in the second step based on terms of t′ and
x (the initial proﬁle of consumption) or we can have a more local approach and just
share the increment (r′ ≡ t′ − t) among the agents based on the proﬁle of shares
obtained in the ﬁrst step. Then, in the new situation, the agents have what they had
previously plus their share of the increment. The property Time Consistency allows
the regulator to indiﬀerently use one or the other methods: when Time Consistency
holds, the regulator can use the proﬁle x to share t′ or y to share t′ − t, the ﬁnal
allocation of the second step y′ remains the same:
Time Consistency: For all N , all i ∈ N , all t, t′ ≥ t and all x,
8For a recent example see Moulin (2000).
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s(N, r′, x) = s(N, r′ − r, s(N, r, x)) + s(N, r, x)
Our family of methods obviously meets this dynamic consistency property. An
important consequence is that a method in this family stays consistent between suc-
cessive sharing even when the regulator does not know at each step the amount to
be shared at the next step. Note that the intuition remains true for every successive
amount to be shared t ≤ t′ ≤ t′′...
6 Conclusion
Allocating property rights on an open access resource which has been freely exploited
in the past is often very problematic. The most common method for the applications
discussed here is allocating property rights free of charge, based upon historic use.
Fair allocation in this context is a very controversial issue because involved agents
typically rely on two diﬀerent principles to determine the allocation: ﬁrst in time, ﬁrst
in rights and historical accountability. We construct a simple model inspired by the
claims problem literature to show that these two positions are in fact compatible: they
deﬁne bounds to the set of possible allocations. Our main contribution is to provide
a family of methods meeting both bounds and characterize the extreme points of this
family: the equal sharing and the uniform gains methods.
The equal sharing method is traditionally associated with the historical account-
ability principle but, surprisingly, it is the most regressive method among the family
we propose. The uniform gains method is the one which aims to equalize as much as
possible the total shares among all agents within the bounds imposed by ﬁrst in time,
ﬁrst in rights. Thus, this method should be the one associated with the egalitarian
goal if one considers the family of methods we propose.
For the important problem of allocating CO2 emissions, many observers have
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urged that in an international agreement, emissions rights should be allocated by
reference to population (see for example, Posner and Sustein, 2008). It should be
noted that our model encompasses this situation: we can simply deﬁne the society N
as being composed of individuals and the proﬁle of emissions x as being the per capita
proﬁle of emissions (i.e. the ratio of emissions of a country over its population).
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A Proof: Preliminaries
In both proofs we use a property that is not described in the main body of the paper,
equal treatment of equal. This property is a basic fairness requirement, broadly used
in the distributive justice literature (see for example Moulin, 2004). It states that
agents with the same characteristics should be treated equally:
Equal treatment of equal: For all N , all i, j ∈ N , i 6= j and all x,
xi = xj ⇒ yi = yj
The reader can easily check that in our set up ﬁrst in time, ﬁrst in rights and
historical accountability imply together equal treatment of equal.
B proof of theorem 1
Proof. Note that, formally, we use sustainability, ﬁrst in time, ﬁrst in rights, con-
sistency and equal treatment of equal to characterize the uniform gains method.
Without loss of generality we rank agents from lowest to highest past exploitation:
x1 ≤ ... ≤ xn.
Step 1
First, consider any proﬁle x and a total resource t such that nx1 ≤ ... ≤ nxn ≤ t.
• by sustainability and equal treatment of equal : yn ≤ 1/n(t− nxn) = t/n− xn.
• however, by ﬁrst in time, ﬁrst in rights : yn + xn ≥ t/n, otherwise an agent
i 6= n must obtain a total share yi + xi ≥ t/n ≥ yn + xn which contradicts ﬁrst
in time, ﬁrst in rights.
• thus, yn = t/n− xn.
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• by ﬁrst in time, ﬁrst in rights, yn−1+xn−1 ≤ yn+xn = t/n. Also, yn−1+xn−1 ≥
1/(n − 1)(t − (xn + yn)) = t/n, otherwise an agent i 6= n, n − 1 must obtain a
total share yi+ xi ≥ yn−1+ xn−1 which contradicts ﬁrst in time, ﬁrst in rights.
• thus yn−1 = t/n− xn−1.
• we could repeat the argument for all i < n − 1. Thus, yi = t/n − xi for all i
which coincides with the uniform gains method.
Step 2
Now, consider t such that nx1 ≤ ... ≤ nxn−1 ≤ t ≤ nxn.
• by sustainability, yn = 0.
• by ﬁrst in time, ﬁrst in rights, yn−1 ≥ 1/(n− 1)(t− (xn))− xn−1.
• by sustainability, yn−1 ≤ sn−1(N, rn−1, xn−1).
• by adding consistency, sn−1(N, rn−1, xn−1) = sn−1(N\n, rn−1−sn(N, r, x), xn−1N\n).
• thus, considering the combination of the two above properties and equal treat-
ment of equal, yn−1 ≤ 1/(n−1)(t−(xn))−xn−1 where 1/(n−1)(t−(xn))−xn−1 =
sn−1(N, rn−1, xn−1).
• Thus, yn−1 = 1/(n− 1)(t− (xn))− xn−1.
• as in step 1, we could repeat the argument for all i 6= n, n − 1. Thus, yi =
1/(n − 1)(t − (xn)) − xi for all i 6= n and yn = 0, which coincides with the
uniform gains method.
Step 3
Now, consider r such that nx1 ≤ ... ≤ t ≤ xn−1 ≤ nxn.
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• by sustainability, yn = yn−1 = 0.
• as in step 2, by ﬁrst in time, ﬁrst in rights, sustainability, consistency and equal
treatment of equal, yn−2 = 1/(n− 2)(T − (xn + xn−1))− xn−2.
• as in step 1, we could repeat the argument for all i 6= n, n − 1, n − 2. Thus,
yi = 1/(n− 1)(t− (xn+xn−1))−xi for all i 6= n, n− 1 and yn = yn−1 = 0 which
coincides with the uniform gains method.
• repeat for all possible values of t (recall that because of our notation nx1 ≤ t).
C Proof of theorem 2
Proof. Note that, formally, we use autarky, historical accountability and equal treat-
ment of equal to characterize the equal sharing method. Without loss of generality
we rank agents from lowest to highest past exploitation: x1 ≤ ... ≤ xn. Pick x′ such
that x′i = x1 for all i, and t′ such that r′ = r.
• by equal treatment of equal, y′i = rn for all i
• by autarky, y′1 = y1 = rn
• if n = 2, by budget balance (∑N yi = r), y2 = y1 = r2 which coincides with the
equal sharing method.
• otherwise, by historical accountability, y2 ≤ y1 = r/n and y2 ≥ (r−(r/n))/n−1
(otherwise, an agent i 6= 1, 2 obtains an yi ≥ y2 which contradicts historical
accountability). Given that (r − (r/n))/n− 1 = r
n
, y2 = rn .
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• we could repeat the argument for all i > 2. Thus, yi = rn for all i which is
precisely the equal sharing method. Given that x was picked arbitrarily, the
proof is complete.
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